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SUBJECT: GUINEA-BISSAU: SECURITY SECTOR REFORM AND THE
SECOND ROUND ELECTIONS

REF: N/A

Classified By: PolCouns David Mosby for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

¶1. (C) SUMMARY: On July 14 and 15, PolCouns held meetings in Bissau with several African diplomats and other representatives from the international community resident in Guinea-Bissau to discuss the upcoming second round OF presidential elections on July 26, ongoing Security Sector Reform (SSR), and progress on investigations into the assassinations from earlier this year. While nobody expects any violence in the lead-up to, or the day of, the election, everyone is concerned that there may be some kind of disturbances or violence following the elections. Diplomats point to presidential candidate Kumba Yala,s accusations against his opponent, Malam Bacai Sanha, as well as his attempts to exacerbate divisions within the military, as a possible sign of his bad faith in the electoral process. On the other hand, diplomats noted some welcome progress regarding SSR in Guinea-Bissau, specifically agreements concerning the creation of a National Guard force and the reduction of the military,s size. Everyone expressed support for some sort of international investigation into this year,s assassinations, and many are in favor of either some sort of security for investigators or some sort of international stabilization force for the country. Finally, some diplomats claim that fractionalization within the military has severely limited the ability of the military,s Chief of Defense, Zamora Induta, to act. END SUMMARY.

THE PRS ATTEMPTS TO DE-LEGITIMIZE THE ELECTION

¶2. (C) According to numerous sources in Bissau, Kumba Yala and his spokesmen in the Party of Social Renewal (PRS) have violated the electoral code of conduct that all political parties signed by engaging in verbal attacks against the ruling African Party for the Independence of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde (PAIGC) and its candidate, Malam Bacai Sanha. Many of the accusations have been personally directed at Sanha, for example by claiming that he has received funds from Al Qaeda. Additionally, the PRS has accused the PAIGC of preparing to commit mass electoral fraud. It is widely believed that these accusations are designed to create a sense of illegitimacy surrounding the elections. Therefore, when Sanha wins the election, as he widely expected to do, Yala can claim fraud and reject the election results. (NOTE: PRS accusations have continued; according to news reports, they have recently accused the Guinea-Bissau National Civilian Society Movement) a group of over 100 organizations) of interfering on behalf of the PAIGC. The Movement had recently accused the PRS of allegedly issuing fraudulent voter cards in Guinea-Bissau,s southern region. END NOTE.)

Potential for Violence

13. (C) The Brazilian Charge felt that there was a real possibility that Yala might refuse to recognize the results, especially if they are closer than expected as a result of protests votes or abstentions from people angry with the PAIGC. The Angolan and Nigerian Charges and the Senegalese and South African Ambassadors all believed that post-election violence is a distinct possibility. The Senegalese Ambassador went further, arguing that violence is not only possible but likely. In his view, the country,s recent violence is about the settling of scores dating back to independence, and more violence is yet to come. He argued that Senegalese President Abdoulaye Wade needed to visit Guinea-Bissau following the election and do for the country what he did for Mauritania, namely helping to negotiate a political settlement to the country,s ongoing issues.

14. (C) United Nations (UN) Representative of the Secretary General (RSG), Joseph Mutaboba, however, downplayed the risk of violence following the elections, saying simply that the international community must reiterate that everyone has to accept the results of the elections. In his opinion, if the international community maintains pressure on parties in Guinea-Bissau, they will listen.

SECURITY SECTOR REFORM

15. (C) According to the deputy chief of the European Union (EU) Security Sector Reform (SSR) Mission in Bissau, as well as others on his staff, agreement on implementing legislation (so-called "organic laws") for the country,s new security sector and defense structure is close. There had been some

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controversy about the creation of a National Guard force in the country. (NOTE: The National Guard force would be a paramilitary police force analogous to a gendarmerie. END NOTE.) Although the National Guard force would fall under the jurisdiction of the Minister of the Interior, the draft implementing legislation made reference to members of the National Guard as members of the military because in times of national crisis command and control for the force shifts to the Ministry of Defense, unlike for the Public Order Police. The Minister of Defense objected, arguing that National Guard members are not part of the military and should not be referred to as soldiers. This issue was resolved in a subsequent meeting and language in the legislation will be amended. In addition, while Acting Chief of Defense, Naval Captain Zamora Induta, initially had rejected the call in the National Defense Strategy to reduce the armed forces numbers from the current level of approximately 4,500 to 3,500, he has reevaluated his position and agreed to accepted the new size limit.

16. (C) According to the EU SSR mission, the question of the country's maritime forces has not been resolved. Guinea Bissau,s National Defense Strategy, which as been approved by the country,s National Assembly and serves as the basis for the EU SSR mission,s work, calls for the new National Guard force to have a coast guard component to handle all maritime policing functions, including counter-narcotics. The military has objected and wants the navy to lead all counter-narcotics operations. According to the EU SSR officers, the military is afraid that the coast guard will compete with the navy for resources from the international community; with counter-narcotics under the aegis of the coast guard, international funds would be re-routed from the navy to the coast guard. This issue remains unresolved.

THE COMMISSION OF INQUIRY AND STABILIZATION FORCE

17. (C) According to the Senegalese Ambassador, both an International Commission of Inquiry (ICI) and a stabilization force are necessary for Guinea-Bissau. In the Ambassador,s opinion, the June killings were a "crime" - they were

political assassinations using the pretext of a coup attempt.

The South African Ambassador told PolCouns that an international security force might be necessary for the protection of international investigators and perhaps for key government officials as well, if an inquiry is to be successful.

¶8. (C) The Angolan Charge did not believe that the investigation requires a security element, claiming instead that the guilty parties will in all likelihood flee instead of attacking investigators. However, while he did not believe a security element necessary for the investigation, he did agree in principle that some kind of stabilization mission could be beneficial during SSR. He argued that the African Union (AU) should take the lead in order to bring in Africans from outside the sub-region. The Senegalese Ambassador agreed that a stabilization force would be necessary to successfully implement SSR. Although he said that any stabilization force should not have any Senegalese troops because of sensitivities enduring from the role of Senegalese army during the 1998 civil war. The Brazilian Charge opined that the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) should send a security force to Guinea-Bissau.

¶9. (C) The EU SSR Mission officers questioned the wisdom of pursuing any investigation into the assassinations. They argued that there has been no resolution to the numerous other assassinations in Guinea-Bissau's history and that one investigation could snowball into requests for investigations into every political assassination since independence. They argued that this could redirect focus away from SSR, which in their opinion is more fundamental resolving the country's political problems due to the involvement of the armed forces in politics.

INDUTA AND INDJAI

¶10. (C) According to the Angolan Charge, Kumba Yala has alienated the senior leadership within the military, including Acting Chief of Defense Induta as well as his deputy Colonel Antonio Injai. Yala had been trying to use divide-and-conquer tactics by leveling accusations of complicity in recent assassinations against Induta, but not Indjai. He has also told lower-ranking officers that he will promote them if he becomes president. However, this seems to have backfired because Indjai seems to have thrown in his lot

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with Induta, according to the Brazilian Charge and the EU SSR mission. (NOTE: While Sanha has remarked that as president he would see no reason to remove Induta from his post, Yala has declared that he would remove Induta as Chief of Defense. If Indjai has indeed firmly allied himself with Induta, it remains unclear who Yala would appoint as Chief of Defense. END NOTE.)

¶11. (C) According to the Senegalese Ambassador, Induta is a hostage and could be killed at any time. (He said the same is true for Prime Minister Carlos Gomes) According to the Senegalese Ambassador, Induta was recently forcibly taken out of his temporary staff headquarters in Bissau (the actual staff headquarters had been partially destroyed in the bomb blast that killed Tagme Na Wai, Induta's predecessor, in early March), taken to a military camp in the countryside, and threatened by a number of Balanta officers. Essentially, Induta was given his operating limits as to what he can and cannot do or say. The real power in the military, the Ambassador proclaimed, is Indjai. He added that Induta always travels with massive protection.

¶12. (C) The Senegalese Ambassador reported that Induta feels isolated from other ECOWAS Chiefs of Defense. He feels insecure in his position and needs other countries to recognize him so that he can consolidate his authority.

¶13. (C) COMMENT: We concur that there is a risk of violence following the second round elections. Additionally, it has become increasingly clear that Induta,s position is precarious. The incident in which Induta was threatened points to the potential for conflict within the armed forces.

Hopefully, a newly elected President will be able to successfully nominate and confirm someone as Chief of Defense, consolidate power, and proceed forward with SSR. It appears that Induta is best placed to do so, although there is a good chance that a successful inquiry into the March assassination will demonstrate that Induta was involved in the assassination of the former president and perhaps the former chief of defense. The international community will need to move quickly following election of the new president to strengthen the civilian government,s authority over the armed forces. END COMMENT.

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